WOOD v. FINNELL.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Alppeal8 of Kentucky'.
WOOD v. FINNELL.

SMITHEY v. FINNELL.

An action on the case will lie for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit without probable cause, although there was neither an attachment nor an arrest.
In such a case the fees of counsel, the expenses of witnesses, and all the reasonahle expenses incurred in the defence of the malicious suit, in excess of the
ordinary costs, should constitute the measure of damages. The removal from one jurisdiction to another for the avowed purpose of bringing
an action in the latter forum, does not raise any presumption of a want of probable cause.
THESE several actions were originally instituted in'the court of
Mercer, and by change of venue were heard in the Boyle Circuit Court. It was alleged, in substance, in each case, that the
plaintiff and the defendant were both citizens of the county of Mercer, and the defendant, with the view and for the purpose of annoying the plaintiff, and to subject him to unnecessary trouble, left the
county of his residence (Mercer) and falsely pretended to Qhange
his residence from the state of Kentucky to the state of Indiana;
that he actually went to the state 6f Indiana, not for the purpose
of residing there in good faith, but to enable him to institutd an
action in the Circuit Court of the United States within and for the
district of Kentucky, held at the city of Louisville, for an assault
alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff on the defendant.;
that claiming his residence in Indiana, for no other purpose than
to sue the plaintiff, the defendant, on the 1st of May, in the year
1869, wickedly and maliciously, 'and without probable cause, and
intending only to harass and vex the plaintiff, under color of legal
process, did sue and cause to be instituted and filed in the Circuit
Court of the United States within and for the district of Kentucky,
held at Louisville, a declaration in his, the defendant's, name
against the plaintiff and pthers, in which he alleged and stated

that the plaintiff, on the

-

day of -,

in the year 1868, with

force and arms, entered his, the defendant's, house at midnight, and
made an assault upon him, the defendant, beat him with sticks, &c.,
to his great damage, viz: the sum of $10,000. That the statements, such and all of them, in said declaration contained were
false, and so known to the defendant at and before the bringing of the' action; that the plaintiff was in no manner connected
with said assault, if any such had been committed; and the defendVoL. XXVI.-87
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ant, knowing this fact, maliciously and falsely, and without probable
cause, made the false statements in said declaration contained, viz:
that the.plaintiff assaulted, beat and bruised the defendant; and
.claimed- of plaintiff $10,000 in damages, when lie knew, as plaintiff avers, that the plaintiff had not committed any of the wrongs
complained of, or had any connection therewith; that the plaintiff
in obedience to the process in said action, appeared in person and
by counsel, and made defence, and at the October term of said
court for that year a trial was had and a judgment, on defendant's
own testimony, rendered for the plaintiff, and said action for the
alleged assault, &c., was then and there finally ended and determined, by a verdict and judgment in favor of this plaintiff. By
reason of the malicious institution of said action, and its malicious
prosecution without any cause the plaintiff alleges that lie expended
large sums of money, other than the costs of the action allowed by
law, in paying the expenses of himself and Witnesses to and from
Mercer county to Louisville while attending the trial, amounting to
---; also paid $ - attorney's fees to defend said action, and
loss of time, &c., amounting in all the damages to $1500, &c.
Demurrers to the several petitions were sustained by the court
below, and the plaintiffs (the appellants) appealed to this court.
T. C.Bell, Thompson & Thompson,
Bradley, for appellants.

. A. &' P. Hardin and

Kyle & Poston and Van Winkle & Bodes, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, J.-The action instituted in the United States Circuit
Court being a civil action, the sole question in these cases is, can
an action for malicious prosecution, or rather an action on the case
be maintained for the institution and prosecution, without probable
cause, of a malicious anc vexatious suit. The elementary books, in
treating of the action for malicious prosecution, lay down the rule
that there are three descriptions of damages, either of which is sufficient to support that action, and some one of them must appear
or the action will fail: 1. To the person, by imprisonment. 2. To
the reputation, by scandal. 3. To the property, by expense: 3
Cooley's Blackstone and notes 126; 2 Selwyn's Nisi Prius 252.
This rule was evidently established after the enactment of the
Statute of Marlebridge, giving to the defendant his costs in the
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event the plaintiff was nonsuited or failed to recover ; for, at common law, prior to that enactment, such actions could be maintained
whether the property of the defendant was seized or not, or
whether lie had incurred expense in defending it; and regarding
then, as now, the bringing of a civil action to be a matter of
right, the plaintiff was liable in damages for the malicious institution and prosecution of such an action without probable cause.
After the statute giving costs to the defendant, it was held by the
common law courts that no action could be maintained on account
of the institution and prosecution of a civil action without probable
cause, and therefore no action could lie for a vexatious ejectment.
In all such cases the plaintiff must have gone beyond the proper
remedy for the enforcement of his claim, such as prqcuring an illegal order of arrest, or requiring excessive bail, before the action
could be maintained. This entire doctrine is based on the idea
that the plaintiff bringing the action is sufficiently punished, and
the defendant fully recompensed by the statute requiring the plaintiff to pay all the costs. We perceive no good reason for following
this rule, and denying to the defendant a remedy when his damages
exceed the ordinary costs of the action. The fact that a plaintiff
has been subjected to the payment of costs profalso clamore, is no
recompense to the defendant when the latter has, by reason of the
malicious proceedings on the part of the plaintiff, sustained damage.
In cases where the plaintiff has mistaken his action, or been nonsuited, or where by reason of some imaginary claim, he has seen
proper to sue the defendant, it is not pretended that any action for
damages can be maintained; but where the claim is not only false,
but the action is prompted alone by malice and without any probable cause, the defendant's right of recovery, for the expenses incurred and damages sustained, should be as fully recognised as if his
property had been attached or his body taken charge of by the
sheriff. While the damages may be less in the one case than the
other, the legal right exists; and some remedy should be afforded.
If the facts alleged in these petitions are true, and they must be so
treated on demurrer, it would be a singular system of jurisprudence
that would admit the wrong and still withhold the remedy. If the
defendant in these cases, at the time he left KentUcky and claimed
his residence in Indiana, had a cause of action against the plaintiffs, or any probable grounds for believing that a cause of action
existed, he had the right to select the forum in which to prosecute.
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it, and in such a case his removal from one jurisdiction to another,
if for the avowed purpose of bringing the action, is not to be
regarded as evidence of a want of probable cause. Having a cause
of action or a probable cause for bringing it, he had the right to
institute proceedings in any court having jurisdiction. It must
appear that the action was founded in malice, instituted without
probable cause, and that the plaintiff has been damaged. When
the reputation has not been assailed, or the defendant imprisoned,
or his property seized, or its use prevented, the damages should be
confined to the loss of time, and the reasonable expenses incurred
in the defence of the action beyond the ordinary costs.
In these cases it is alleged that the plaintiffs, by reason of the
prosecution of the actions against them, were compelled to pay
large sums of money as fees to counsel, expenses of witnesses, &c.
These items of expenses and the loss of time in the necessary defence
of the action, all enter into the question of damages, and from the
facts admitted by the demurrer, resulted alone from the malice of
the defendant in the prosecution of an action when he knew he had
no claim against them.
In the case of Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, it was held, "that
when a civil suit was commenced and prosecuted maliciously and
without probable cause, and is terminated in favor of the defendant,
the latter may recover the damages sustained by him, and it is not
material whether the suit was commenced by process of attachment
or by summons only." In Waterer v. Freeman, cited in Esp.
Dig. 527, "If a man sue me in a civil suit, yet if his suit be utterly
without ground, and that certainly known to himself, I may have
an action against him for the damages he putteth me to by his ill
practice." In the case of Whiipple v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 581, an
action was instituted under a statute to prevent vexatious suits, to
which was added a count at common law for the malicious prosecution of the vexatious civil action. The court in that case, by
CHURCCH, Justice, in discussing the effect of the statute and the
right of recovery by the plaintiff, said, "But we wish to place our
decision of this question upon broader principles," &c., and quoting
from BAYLEY, Justice, in the case of Eza v. Smith, 2 Chit. 304,
"If a party falsely and maliciously and without probable cause put
the law in motion, that is properly the subject of an action on the
case," and resuming, said: "We think therefore, upon the fundamental principles and analogies of the common law, that the second
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count in the declaration is good." Iilliard on Torts, vol. 1, p.
443, says, "But the qualified custom is 'ow well settled in relation
to civil actions (corresponding with the rule as to criminal prosecutions) that no action lies to recover damages sustained by being
sued in a civil action, unles8 it was malicious and without probable
cause.

'The application of this rule is restricted by the cases cited in
support of it, by confining the right to maintain the action to civil
actions where the party is maliciously held to .bail, or where he
has been mulcted for a larger sum than is claimed in the action,
or where his property has been wrongfully attached; when, in
fact, the party may have sustained greater loss y the prosecution
maliciously of a vexatious suit, than the mere temporary seizure
of his property. It is said, however, in the text, that the action
lies for suing the defendant maliciously, and arresting him when
the court had no jurisdiction, or for suing in a proper court, but
proceeding there vexatiously. Following the doctrine of the common law, that for every injury there is a remedy, we see no reason
for denying a remedy to the plaintiffs in each of these cases; and
where a party seeks a judicial tribunal for the purpose alone of
gratifying his malice, he should be made to recompense the party
injured for the damages actually sustained, and the courts should
see that a remedy is afforded for that purpose.
The judgments of the court below are therefore reversed, and
the causes remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrers,
and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Upon the institution of a civil suit at
common law, it was formerly necessary
for the plaintiff to furnish two or more
responsible persons as his pledges, in
order to secure the prosecution of the
action, and to prevent the court from
being imposed upon by malicious and
groundless litigations. Under this system, in the event of a nonsuit or upon
a default, the plaintiff and his pledges
were regularly amerced, as the penalty
for their improper invasion of a court
of justice, and the amercement duly went
to the king as a well-recognised branch
of the royal revenue. There does not
seem, however, to hare been any general provision by which costs were se-

cured to an innocent defendant, until
the 23 Hen. VIII. ch. 15, for it must
be borne in mind that the Statute of
Marlebridge, ch. -6, only allowed costs
in that special instance, where a tenant
had been maliciously impleaded by his
lord, upon a false charge of having collusively enfeoffed the heir within age in
order, to defraud the lord of his wardship.
This early statute of Hen. VIII., has
been still further extended by subsequent
legislative enactments, and, the system
of amercements having long since fallen
into disuse, it would now seem that the
plaintiff is almost universally liable for
costs, whenever he may chance to fail
in his suit. (Hargrave's note to Co.
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Litt. 161, a. ; Bac. Abr. Costs, d.)
As amercements were originally imposed
for the protection of the public, rather
than for the security of the individual
defendant, it would necessarily seem to
follow that prior to these statutory provisions for costs, no man was sccured
from the consequences of a groundless
and malicious suit, unless he could recover in damages for tile injury he had
sustained. Indeed no less an authority
than Chitty has ventured to suggest that
a defendant, in such case, could, at that
time, have always had his suit at law.
"It seems," he says, "before the statutes entitling the defendant in civil actions to costs, if the suit terminated in
his favor, he might support an action
against the plaintiff, if the proceeding
was maliciousandwithout probablecause :11
(3 Chit. Bla. 126, n.) Among the
cases cited, to sustain this view, is that
of Waterer v. Freenman, Hobart 205-266,
where an action on the case was held to
lie against thn original plaintiff, because
he had resorted to a second execution
before the first had been exhausted.
Said HOBlART, C. J., "If a man sue
me in a proper court, yet if his suit be
utterly without ground of truth, and that
certainly known to himself, I may have
an action of the case against him
for the undue vexation and damage that
he putteth me unto by his ill practice,
though the suit itself be legal." Another
case, also cited, is that' of Atnrood v.
Munger, Style 378, wherein ROLLE, C.
J., says : ".1 hold that an action upon
the case will lie for maliciously bringing
an action against one, when lie had no
probable cause ; and, if such actions are
used to be brought, it would deter'men
from such malicious courses as are too
often put in practice." In neither of
these cases, however, did the facts involved seem to call for the application of
the principles therein expressed; and it
was said, to the contrary, by Lord CA31DENs, in Goslin v. lrilcoc&, 2 Wilson 302,
that "there are no old cases in the old

books of actions for suing where the
plaintiffhad no causeofaction." Nevertheless Hargrave seems to have come to
a very similar conclusion upon the sulbject, for Coke having declared, in Iii.
commentary upon Littleton (Co. Litt.
161, a,), "that a man shall not be
punished for suing of writs in the king',
courts, be it right or w rong ;" the
learned editor sought to qualify the rule
thus laid down by the text in the
following terms: "There is also a
remedy for a false and malicious
prosecution, though the aggravation
of a conspiracy or confederacy is
wanting, and the injury comes from
one only; for, in such a case, the
party prosecuted may have an action
upon the case for damages. I apprehend, too, that such action lies, as well
where the vexation is practised by a
civil suit, as where it is carried on
through the medium of a criminal process. Indeed th numerous cases to be
met with in the books are chiefly for
criminal prqsccutions. But there seems
to be no reason for distiguishing between the writ of conspiracy and aa action upon the case in this respect; and
exclusively of other authorities which
may probably be found on search, Lord.
IoBART, Mr. Sergeant ROLLE, and
Lord HOLT, all concur in the idea that
where a civil suit is commenced falsely
and maliciously, and for the mere parpose of vexation, it is actionable."
It
would seem, however, that this language
of the learned annotator was not epasid.
cred "quite accurate" by WILLIAMS,
J., when cited in argument in the Court
of Common Pleas: Cofterell v. Jones,
11 Com. Bench 722; s. c. 73 Eng.
Com. Law 722. And in Potts v. .hla.y,
I Southard (N. J.) 322, which wds an
action on the case for the malicious
prosecution of a civil suit without probable cause, where neither the person
of the defendant had been arrested, nor
his property attached, the bearing and
weight of the prior adjudications was
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determined by KIRKP.ATRICK, C. J., i:l
the following terms : " The books have
been searched for four hundred years
back, and upon that search it is conceded even by the counsel for the plaintiff below, himself, that no case can be
found in which this action has been
maintained, in circumstances similar to
the present. It is true that there are
general expressions made use of by some
of the annotators, which might seem at
first view, to embrace the case, as Hargrave's Note, supra, and some others ;
so alo in some of the reporters; but
these general expressions, by fair rules
of construction, .are to be limited, and
compared with the adjudged cases themselves, and not to be carried beyond
them. With such limitations, of which
too they will very fairly admit, they are
perfectly consistent with general principies ; but without it they are not law."
While then there seems upon the
one hand to be a want of any direct decionl going to the extent that an action
would lie for the malicious prosecution
of a civil suit prior to the statutory provisions in relation to costs, so upon the
other there are certainly not lacking
some very respectable authorities, which
appear to most positively negative this
view of the ancient common law. Thus
in an old case determined in the time
of Henry VII., and reported in Dyer
285 a, it was said, upon an action of
scandalnm virgnatin for a writ of forger
of false deeds, which was then still pending, that, " no punishment was ever appointed for a suit in law, however it be
false and for vexation."
And so in
Parkrv. Langley, Gilbert's Cases 161,
it was said : "The applying in a civil
action to a court of justice for satisfaction or redress, has been so much favored, that no action has ever been allowed against a plaintiff for such suit
singly and directly on pretence of its
being.false and malicious."
Whatever difference of opinion may
exist as to the extent of the defendant's
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remedy in former times at common law,
upon being maliciously involved in the
defence of a groundless suit, there does
not seem to be any question, in England at least, but that the statutes entailing costs upon the unsuccessful plaintiff now furnish ample compensation to
the defendant for any injury lie may have
sustained in such a case.
" Since the stat. 4 Jac. 1, ch. 3," says
Chitty, in conclyding the note already
cited, "which gives costs to a defendant
in all actions, in case of a nonsuit or
verdict against the plaintiff, and other
statutes giving posts to defendants in
other stages of the cause, it seems that
no action can be gupported merely in
respect of a civil suit maliciously instituted, except in some cases under particular legislative provisions," supra.
And so in the Digest of Swift, irol. 1,
p. 492, it is laid down as being ",well
settled, that at common law, no action
will lie against one for bringing a civil
suit, however malicious and unfounded,
unless tilebody of tilepa~ty is imprisoned, or holden to bail; in all bther
cases, the costs the party recovers are
supposed to be an adequate compensation for the damage he sustains."
See
also, Swill v. Roberts, 12 Mod. 208,
and Parton v. llonnor, I Bos. & Pul.
*205, to the same effect. Said TALFOURD, J., in the case of Cotterell v.
Jonw, 11 Com. Bench 730; s. c. Eng.
Com. Law Rep. 730, " It appears from
the whole current of authorities, that
an action of this description, if maintainable at all, is only maintainable in
respect of legal damage actually sustained ; and that the mere expenditure
of money by the plaintiff in the defence
of the action brought against him does
not constitute such legal damage ; but
that the only measure of damage is,
the costs ascertained by the u-ual course
of law."
This seemingly well-established understanding of the law, so frequently reiterated in the English courts
of justice, does not appear to have been
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successfully questioned in the earlier
American cases : Polts v. laay, suprc;

taken, the same reasoning whkih is here
used to prove that the defendant ought
to have damages upon a false claim,
VanDuzorv. Linderman, 10 Johns. 106;
Kramer v. Stock, 10 Watts 115 ; Tom- would also prove that the plaintiff
linson v. ll'arner, 9 Ohio 104 ; Ray v.
ought to have damages upon a false
Law, I Pet. C. C. 207-210; Allgor v.
plea. He is put to all the expense of
Seliwell, 1 Halst. 166; Munns v. Du- a trial upon such plea, and yet lie can
pont et al., 1 Am.Lead. Cas. *210.
recover nothing therefor but his lawful
'In Potts v. Imlay, supra, determined
costs ; though surely all experience
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
teaches us that the plea of the de1816, the English rule was forcibly sus- fendant is not less frequently false
tained by Chief Justice KInxFATRiCx,
than the claim of the plaintiff. But
in the following language: "Formerly
to what excesses would this lead
the amercement, now the costs are the
us ? where would litigation end
only penalty the law has given against
The truth is, that merely for the exa plaintiff for prosecuting a suit in a
penses of a civil suit, however malicious
court of justice, in the regular and ordiand however groundless, this action
nary way, even though he fail in such
does not lie, nor ever did, so far as I
prosecution. The courts of law are
can find, at any period of our judicial
open to every citizen, and he may sue history. It must be attended, besides
ordinary expenses, with other special
toties quoties upon the penalty of lawful
grievance or damage not necessarily incosts only. These are considered as a
sufficient compensation for the mere ex- cident to a defence, but superadded to it
by the malice and contrivance of the
penses of the defendant in his defence.
They are given to him for this purpose plaintiff; and of these an arrest seems
and he cannot rise up in a court of jus- the only one spoken of in our books."
In this case much stress seems to have
tice and say the legislature have not
been laid upon the fact that the malicious
given him enough. If we were legislators, indeed, perhaps we should be in- prosecution had been instituted before a
justice of the peace, where the costs imclined to say that the costs, in all cases
posed were merely nominal ; but this
where costs are given, should completeconsideration did not prevail with the
ly indemnify the party for all his necescourt. Said SOUTHARD, J., " It is not
sary expenses, both of time and money;
unlikely that some of the inconveniences
but those to whom this high trust is
which have been mentioned at the bar,
committed, in this state, have thought
and we will presume, have wisely
will result from the doctrine now establislied, in the court for the trial of small
thought otherwise. In England, it is
causes. Unprincipled men are often to
believed the costs are in some measure
discretionary with the court, and are
be found in every society, who, for the
sole purpose of vexing and harassing
apportioned to the circumstances of the
case, but here it is not so. They are a neighbor, whom they dislike, will
bring many malicious suits, if the only
fixed by statute, they can neither be increased nor diminished, but, ceterispari- evil they are to suffer is the payment of
bus, are precisely the same in all cases.
the costs in that court. But the conPerhaps a greater latitude given to
trary doctrine would lead to cnnseqiiences not less unpleasant; and if this were
the courts of justice, might in some degree alleviate the hardship now comnot so, we cannot here remedy the evil.
plained of. Besides, if we go to the By enlarging the jurisdiction of judges,
and giving almost nominal costs, the
very equity of the thing, which seems
to be the ground of argument here
legislature have offered temptations to
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the malignant, to bring vexatious suits.
Higher cost, would repress this feeling.
It is only in that court that such suits
are heard of. But the law I conceive
to be clear; and, if remedy be necessary,
it mut come from a different authority
from this court.
In Pt,,gb,-r: v. Bull, I Wend. 345,
however, which was also a malicious
suit without probable cause before a
justice of the peace, this circumstance
was deemed sufficient to distinguish the
case from the English authorities, and
an action upon the case was held to lie
for tie expenses and inconveniences
incurred in defence of the suit, in view
of the gross inadequacy of tile costs
allowed by statute. Said the court:
" When it is considered that malice and
the want of probable cause are tle
foundation of the action, it would seem,
on principle,t to reach cases where the
injury would be equally great, although
the proceeding did not require an arrest
or bail." In I' ipp!M v. Filer, 11
Conn. 582, there seems to have been
shownV a still further tendency to depart
from the English rule. But there the
declaration was held bad for a misjoinder, and the case itself was distinguishable upon the well recognised
ground that there had been a malicious
attachment in the original unfounded
suit. Nevertheless the court takes occasion therein to say, "that taxable
costs afford a very partial and inadequate remuneration for the necessary
ekpenses of defending an unfounded
stit," and therefore seemed inclined to
take the position that in all such cases
the plaintiff should have his ation,
upon the broad principle that no wrong
should be without a remedy.
Very much in the same direction is
the comparatively recent case of Closson v. Rtaple.,, 42 Vt. 209, considered
by the Supreme Court of Vermont in
1869. In that case the court below
declined to charge that the action could
not be maintained without the plaintiff
VOL. XXVI.-88
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had been arrested or his property attached, in the alleged malicious civil"
suit. The Supreme Court sustained
this ruling. Said WILSON, J., "Where
the action is brought and prosecuted
maliciously and without reasonable or
probable cause, the plaintiff asserts no
claim in respect to which he had any
right to invoke the aid of the law. In
such case the plaintiff, by an abuse of
legal process, unjustly subjects the defendant to damages which are not fully
compensated by the costs he recovers.
The plaintiff in such case has no legal
or equitable right to claim that the rule
of law, which allows a suit to be brought
and prosecuted in good faith, withoixt
liability of the plaintiff to pay the defendant damages, except by way and to
the extent of the taxable costs only, if
judgment be rendered in his favor,
should extend to a cause where the suit
was mAl iciouslyprosecuted without probable cause. But where the daniages,
sustained by the defendant in defending
a suit maliciously prosecuted without
reasonable or -probable cause, exceed
the costs obtained by him, he has, and
of right should have, "aremedy by action
on the case.
* * It would be inconsistent with our system of jurisprudence,
in the legitimate use of legal process
to allow in all cases such costs as would
cover all damages the defendant might
sustain by dcfending a suit, without re,gard to the motive which influenced the
plaintift in commencing and prosecuting
it. And it is quife obvious, I think,
that a provision by law, by which the
court would have a discretionary power
to tax and allow the defendant to recover in a malicious and unfounded
suit, such costs by way of damages sustained in the defence of the suit as in
their judgment he was entitled to, could
not be made without infringing the
rights of the plaintiff in such action,
because he would have the right of trial
by jury of the question whether in the
prosecution of tle suit, in which costs
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were to be taxed, malice and the want
of probable cause concurred, and this
question could not be tried in that original suit."
It should notwithstanding be noted
that the court have here laid down a
broader rule than the exigencies of the
case seem to have required, for the suit
seems to have been maliciously and
intentionally brought in the name of a
third party, who was wholly unable to
pay the costs, and if the court had
therefore determined otherwise, the de-

fendant would have 1,een entirely without redress.
It would therefore seem that the circumstauces of the principal case have
for the first time called for tie applica-

tion of that broader rule, indicated in
the judicial dicta already vitcd ; and in
this sense it may pcrhap be said that
tile decision in the principal

ca,e is a

step beyond the limits of any former
adjudication and finds no exact precedent in the records of the common law.
J. P. B.

United States Circuit Court. District of .uew Jersey.
WILLIAMS & ALBRIGIHT v. TIE EMPIRE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY AND B. W. HOPPER.
A plea to a bill of complaint alleging facts, which, if true, may show that one
of the defendants has no interest in the suit, not overruled, but saved to tle defendant to the hearing and then to be considered in the light of tte evidence in
the case.
The legislation of the state making provision for the service of process, a foreign corporation, transacting business there, may be estopped by such legislation
from pleading that tile corporation is not an inhabitant or is not found in the state
for service of process.

A. Q. K6easbey, for complainants.
Geo. Harding,for defendant Hopper.
NIXON, District Judge.-This is a motion to strike out a plea.

The bill of complaint was filed for the infringement of certain
letters patent, against the Empire Transportation Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania

and-doing business as such among other places, at Jersey City, and
elsewhere within the state of New Jersey, and B. W. Hopper, the
agent of said company, in this state.
The -service of the subpoena was made upon the defendant, Hopper.
No appearance has been entered for the defendant corporation;

but Hopper has appeared and pleaded that at the time of the commencement of the suit he was acting merely as station agent at
Newark, New Jersey, for the .Empire Transportation Company, a
corporation organized and operating under the laws of Pennsyl-
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vania; that as such agent he had nothing to do with the construction
and operating of cars for transporting petroleum, nor with the running of the same, within the district of New Jersey, nor in any
other place, his duty as station agent being merely to keep the
books of the company, to collect the amounts due for freights received and shipped, and to make returns for the same to the office
of the company at Philadelphia.
By the consent of parties, the motion to strike out the plea has
been treated as a demurrer, under the rules. The facts stated are
admitted to be true, and the question is whether they. constitute a
sufficient reason why the said Hopper should not have been included,
as a defendant in the suit.
The plea, although not common, is one well known in equity
practice. It is sometimes called a plea in abatement and sometimes
a plea in bar. A defendant is permitted to plead that he does not
sustain the character, which he is alleged to bear in the bill, or that
he has no interest in the subject of the suit : Story's Eq. Pl., §§
732, 734, n.
I am quite sure that the plea ought not to be overruled. The
facts stated may be a defence. The.only doubt I have, is, whether
I should save to the defendant the benefit of the plea to the hearing,-or order it to stand for an answer. But, upon the whole, I
think the former course is the true one, because so far as it appears
to the court, it may prove to be a defence. Matters may be disclosed in the evidence which will establish or avoid it, and no coufse
should now be taken that will preclude the consideration of the
question hereafter. The plea is, therefore, saved tb the hearing,
and to be then treated as the testimony will warrant.
But, I infer, from the tenor of the argument of the counsel,
when the case was before the court, that this is -not the question
which in fact the parties are endeavoring to have decided. They
are reaching after a different matter. They wish to ascertain, if
the proceedings should be discontinued against the defendant, Hopper, for want of interest, whether the suit is still maintainable
against the Empire Transportation Company, a foreign corporation,
in view of the provisions of the 88th section of the " Act concerning
corporations," approved by the legislature of New-Jersey, April 7th
1875 (Rev. of 1877, p. 193), and also of the 1st section of'the Act
of the Congress of the United States, entitled, "A.kn act to determine
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts," &c., approved March 3d
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1875 (18 Stat. 470). The state law referred to enacts, "that in
all personal suits or actions hereafter brought in any court of this
state, against any foreign corporation not holding its charter under
the laws of this state, process may be served upon any officer, director, agent, clerk or engineer of such corporation, either personally, or by leaving a copy at their dwelling-house or usual 1,lace of
abode, or by leaving a copy at the office, depot, or usual place of
business of such foreign corporation." The Act of Congress provides, "that no civil suits shall be brought before either of said
courts (Circuit or District), against any person by any original process or proceeding, in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found, at the time of serving
such process, or commencing such proceeding."
The corporation was not an inhabitant of the state of New Jersey,
at the time of filing the bill and serving the subpoena. It has long
been settled that the body corporate only lives within the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created: Bank of Augusta v.
Earl, 13 Pet. 520 ; Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286. This
results from the fact that it is an artificial being, deriving its life
from its charter, and has no capacity to exist, and no power to
e*-ercise its functions, except as they are conferred by the local
law.
It would seem to be a legitimate if not necessary inference from
this, that a corporation could not be found to be served with proc~ss outside of the place of its creation. Such was the opinion
of the late learned Justice of the Second District (NELSON) in the
case of Day v. The India Rubber Co., 1 Blatch. 628, in which he
quashed a writ of attachment and summons, that had been issued
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District
of New York, against a New Jersey corporation. And in the later
case of Pomeroy v. The N. Y. 4"N. Haven Railroad Co., 4 Blatch.
120, he went a step further and held, that the defendant corporation,. organized in Connecticut, could not be found in New York,
in the sense of being amenable to federal process, although the
legislature of the state of New York, in authorizing the body,-corporate to purchase lands, to enter into contracts and to extend its
road into and over the state, had expressly provided, that it should
be liable to be sued by summons in the same manner as corporations created by the laws of the state, and that the process might
be served on an officer or agent of the company. He says (p. 122),
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"The difficulty here is, in giving effect to this law of New York,
providing for service of process on the defendants. That is regulated, as to this court, by the Act of Congress of 1789, already
referred to, and cannot be altered or modified by any state law.
According to that act, the defendant must be -an inhabitant of the
district or be served with process within it, in order to give the
court jurisdiction. Now, service of process by the assent of this
company, upon an agent within the state, cannot be said to be service upon an iuhabitant of the district or upon a-person within it.
The corporation is still a Connecticut company resident within the
state of Connecticut, but consenting to be sued in New York by
service of process upon its agent; and, however effectual this service may be, in conferring jurisdiction over the company, upon
tribunals governed by the laws of New York, it cannot have that
effect in respect to federal tribunals, which are not only not governed
by the state laws, but are governed by the Act of Congress, which has
prescribed a different rule."
But the Supreme Court have given a different construction to
the act and of course have come to a different conclusion.
Since the recent case of .x parte Schollenberger, 6 Otto
369, it would seem that the court should look to the legislation
of the state, and exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,
when provision has been made by state law, for service of the process. That action was one of a large number instituted in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of'
Pennsylvania, by a citizen of that state against a foreign fire insurance company, which corporation had been allowed to transact its
business in Pennsylvania by a law of the state, upon certain terms,
one of which was, that a person should be designated upon whom
a service of summons could be made, in case of silit against them.
The Circuit Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction,
and because the law of the state could not confer it; but the
Supreme Court, after long irgument and careful consideration,
issued a mandamus directing the Circuit Court to reinstate the
suits and proceed to trial, holding that a foreign corporation, transacting business in Pennsylvania, in view of the legislation of the
state, was found there for the purpose of service of the writ. As
the last utterance of the highest tribunal, this must now be accepted
as the law, and it is instructive to review the steps by which the
court reached the result.
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In the .Bank of Augusta v. .Earl,sz pra, it was held, that a corporation might be deemed to have an existence beyond the place
of its creation, to the extent of making contracts, which the courts
would enforce.
In The Lafayette Is. Co. v. Frencl, 18 Iow. 404, the question was, whether the federal tribunals would acknowledge the
validity of a judgment, obtained in the courts of the state, against
a foreign corporation, when the state law authorized tlh(' crporation to carry on business within the state only on the condition
that service of process on the agent should be considered and taken
as service upon the corporation itself.
The court held, that the state had the right to impose such a condition, in regard to suits before its own tribunals, and that when
the corporation sent its agent into the state to effect insurances, it
must be presumed to have assented to the rule.
In .ailroad Co. v. Harris,12 Wall. 65, a suit was brought in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, for injuries received from a collision
.on the road in the state of Yirginia. The company received its
charter from the state of Maryland.. Authority was given by the
legislature of the state of Virginia to extend the road into that
Commonwealth, clothing the company with all the rights and privileges granted, and subjecting it to all the obligations and penalties
imposed by the original Maryland charter. Congress subsequently
passed an act, authorizing the extension of a lateral road into the
District of Columbia, and conferring upon the company the right
to exercise the same powers and privileges and imposing upon them
the same restrictions, in the construction of the said lateral road
within the district as they might exercise or be subject to, under
and by virtue of the Act of Incorporation of the state of Maryland.' After argument and re-argument, the court held that no new
corporations were created by this legislation in the state of Virginia, or in the district; that the old corporation remained unchanged in its unity, but with the sphere of its operations greatly
enlarged; and that although foreign and incapable of migration
from Maryland, it might, nevertheless, be found in the District
of Columbia, exercising its functions and authority upon such conditions as were prescribed by the Act of Congress. "One of these
conditions may be," says Mr. Justice SWAYNrE, speaking for the
whole court, "that it shall consent to be sued there. If it do busi-
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ness there, it will be presumed to have assented, and will be bound
accordingly."
This decision was referred to with approbation by the court, in
the subsequent case of the Railroad Co. v. 'Whittier, 13 Wall. 284.
It will be observed, from an inspection of these cases, that it is
nowhere asserted that jurisdiction can be conferred upon the fed
eral courts by the legislation of the state. Indeed, such an inference is expressly repudiated in the Pennsylvania Insurance Cases,
Ex parte Sehollenberger, supra, where the court say: " States
cannot, by their legislation, confer jurisdiction on the courts of the
.United States ; neither can consent of parties give jurisdiction,
when the facts do not; but both state legislation and consent of
parties may bring about a state of facts which will authorize the
courts of the United States to take cognisance of a case." See
Ex parte McNeill, 13 Wall. 243.
It would, perhaps, more nearly accord with the principle announced in these insurance cases to say that, by the legislation of
a state, foreign corporations, doing business in the state, may be
estopped from setting up, in bar of a suit in the federal -courts,
that they are not amenable to the jurisdiction
But whether this may be the meaning of the decision or not, I
am constrained by the authority of these cases in the Supreme
Court, to hold that the jurisdiction of the court over the present
suit is not to be defeated because the defendant -corporation was
organized under the laws of a sister state. It was transacting
business here, and by the provisions of the local law (Rev. of
1877, 193), it is subject to process, by serving the same upon one
of its agents, and has waived its right to question the legality of
such a mode of service.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
AVERY A. COLE v. MERCHANTS' BANK OF WATERTOWN.
The contracts of a maker and a guarantor of commercial paper are separate and
distinct and cannot be joined as one cause of action against both.
Whether a contract of guaranty in general is assignable at common law, it is
the better doctrine that a guaranty written on a ncgotiabld note or bill addressedto no particular person partakes of the negotiable quality of the note, and passes
as an incident to it, to every bonafide holder for value of the note.
Independently of this doctrine, a guaranty is assignable in equity, and under
the code of Indiana, the assignee may sue upon it in his own name.
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Tis was a suit by the appellee, as endorser of the Davis Sewing
Machine Company against Avery A. Cole, Leonidas A. Cole, and
Nathaniel Pierce, upon the following promissory note and guaranty:
"$1250.
"Logansport, Ind., December 10th 1873.
- Six months after date I promise to pay to the order of the Davis
Sewing Machine Company, twelve hundred and fifty dollars, payable at the Peoples' Bank,' Logansport, Ind., for value received,
with ten per cent. interest, without any relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws, and with ten per cent. fees if collected by
attorney. Drawer and endorsers jointly and severally waive presentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest and non-payment of this note. No credit allowed on this note unless endorsed
on back by the payee.
A. A. COLE."
On the back were the following endorsements: "We jointly or
severally for value received hereby guarantee the prompt payment
of the within note.
L. A. COLE,
NATHANIEL PIERCE."

"Pay to the order of Merchants' Bank of Watertown, New York.
"Davis Sewing Machine Company, of Watertown, N. Y.
L. A. JOHNSON, Treasurer."
-The complaint was in three paragraphs. The first set forth the
note, the guaranty and endorsement; averred that the guarantors
had due notice of its non-payment, &c., and prayed judgment against
the maker and guarantors. The second paragraph was substantially like the first. The third was against the maker and guarantors as joint makers.
Upon appearing to the action, A. A. Cole filed a plea to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. L. A. Cole and Pierce
filed a demurrer to each paragraph of the complaint, assigning for
causes of demurrer to edch paragraph that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that there was a defect
of parties defendant, and that the plaintiff (appellee) had not legal
capacity to sue.
These demurrers were overruled by the court, and exceptions
reserved.
• A demurrer was sustained to the answer of want of jurisdiction
by A. A. Cole, and he excepted.
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He then answered in general denial.
The defendants, L. A. Cole and Nathaniel Pierce, the guarantors, answered :
1. That the plaintiff is not, and that the Davis Sewing Machine
Company is, the real owner of the note sued on.
2. That the plaintiff. is not the real party in interest, for the
reason that the note was endorsed to it without consideration, simply for collection, and the consideration of said guaranty had wholly
failed, setting out the particulars.
3. That by the guaranty on said note they did not intend to.
become joint makers or endorsers of said note, as the plaintiff well
knew, and that the contract of guaranty upon said, note was a separate, independent agreement, which did not pass to the plaintiff by
the endorsement of the note, and that it had not been endorsed to
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred severally to the first 'nd third paragraphs
of answer of the guarantors, and moved to strike fromi the second,
the allegations that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest,
and that the note was endorsed for collection merely. The -court
sustained the demurrers to the first and third paragraphs of answer,
and overruled the motion to strike out parts of the second.
Exceptions were reserved. The guarantors filed an amended
first paragraph of answer, to which a demurrer was overruled.
Reply in denial. Trial by the court, joint judgment, over a
motion for a new trial, for the plaintiff against all the defendants..
Ht. K. Farrand,J. A. Traver and L. A. Cole, for appellants.
James Bradley and Samuel E. Williams, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-We proceed to the consideration and decision of
such questions, arising in this cause, as may be necessary to its
determination.
It is manifest that L. A. Cole and Nathaniel Pierce were guarantors upon the note: Sample v. Martin, 46 Ind. 226. If they could
not properly be jointly sued with the maker then the court erred in
sustaining the demurrer to the answer of A. A. Cole, the maker, as
he was not a resident of the county in which the suit was brought,
a fact he answered to the jurisdiction of the court. Acts of 1875,"
p. 119.
VOL. XXVI.-89
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The contracts of the maker and guarantors of the note were
separate and distinct contracts. They were iiot a joint cause of
action and the maker and guarantors could not properly be jointly
sued. This is settled law in Indiana: Bichwinc v. ,S oville, 54 Ind.
150, and cases cited; -Dickerson v. Coulter, 45 Id. 447. There
was, therefore, a misjoinder of causes of action and of parties defendant, but there was no demurrer to the complaint on either of
these grounds. There was a demurrer for a defect of parties, in
this, that the Davis Sewing Machine Company ought to have been
made a party to answer to its interest.
Want of facts to constitute a cause of action was also made a
ground of demurrer by the guarantors, but there was a good cause
of action against them. The guaranty was duly assigned to the
plaintiff; notice of the default of the maker had been given; the
liability of the guarantors was fixed, and all this was shown in the
complaint. The question is made whether the contract of guaranty
is assignable, and whether if so, that in this case had been assigned.
We are satisfied that the contract of guaranty in this case was
assignable, and passed with the note on which it was written, by
the endorsement of the Davis Sewing Machine Company, to the
Merchants' Bank of Watertown, New York. See Studabaker v.
Cody, 54 Ind. 586. As the note and guaranty were duly transferred by written endorsement to the bank, the plaintiff in this suit,
it was not necessary that the assignor should be made a party to
answer to its interest: 2 R. S. 1876, p. 85, sect. 6. The endorsement also passed the legal title to the note and guaranty, to the
plaintiff, making it at least primafacie, the real party in interest.
The name of the plaintiff prima facie imports a corporation, and
the complaint was sufficient: Harris v. The Muskingum, Se., Co.,
4 Blackf. 267. We think the guarantors were not discharged by
delay in giving notice: Sample v. Martin, supra; 2 Pars. on
Cont. 28, 29.
On the evidence, we cannot say the court erred in overruling the
motion for a new trial.
It was proved that the plaintiff was the real bona fide owner" of
the note for a valuable consideration; that a delay of fifty-one days
may have occurred in giving notice to the guarantors of the nonpayment of the note by the maker, but it is not shown that the
guarantors were injured by the delay, that there was a consideration for the guaranty, which is not shown to have failed, &c.
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The judgment is reversed with costs as to A. A. Cole, the maker
of the note. It is affirmed with costs as to L. A. Cole and Nathaniel Pierce, the guarantors.
The following opinion on a petition for a rehearing of the foregoing opinion was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-An earnest petition for a rehearing has been filed
in this cause, in which it is insisted that a contract of guaranty is
not assignable at common law. We concede that .there is a conflict
of authorities on this point. The form of the guaranty in this
case will be noticed. It is addressed to no particular person. The
endorsement transferring the paper is below the guaranty and is not
limited to the note, but is in these words: "Pay to the order of
Mferchants' Bank, Watertown, New York." It is plain enough
that this assignment was intended to transfer the note and guaranty
-the entire instrument. The entire instrument was delivered to
the assignee. While the general doctrine may be admitted to be that
contracts of guaranty are not assignable at common law, yet there are
authorities to the effect that a guaranty written upon a negotiable note
or bill, addressed to no particular person, partakes of the negotiable
quality of said bill or note, and that any person having the legal
instrument takes in like manner the incident: "tcLaren v. Watso'n,
26 Wend. 425; Cooper v. Dedrick, 22 Barb. 516; Webster v.
Cobb, 17 ll. 459, and cases cited. This is regarded by Story and
Daniel as the better doctrine: Story on Bills, 4th ed., sect. 458;
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, vol. 2, sect. 1777. Were it
necessary to the decision of this case we should hold the same doctrine. But contracts of guaranty were assignable in equity though
not at law: Story on Bills, sect. 657; Averts v. The Commonwealth, 20 Grattan 750. In Edwards on Bills and Notes 219, it
is said that "a contract of guaranty, though endorsed upon a negotiable note, and drawn in general terms warranting its collection is
not of itself negotiable, because the statute making priomissory
notes negotiable is not extended to any other instrument relating
to the note."
This question arose in The First National Bank v. Carpenter,
41 Iowa 518, in which the court, after referring generally to the
subject, disposes of the question in the case ai follows: "But
under our statute this and every other kind of contract is assignable and the assignee may sue thereon in his own name." So the
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codo of this state, which is similar to that of Iowa, has solved the
controverted question for us. A contract of guaranty is assignablo
under our code: -Fletcherv. 1ratt, 7 llackf. 522; 1Patter8on V.
Crawford,12 Ind. 241 ; Splaln v. Gillespie, 48 Id. 397 ; lTopen
v. Pound, 10 Id. 32.
No points were made as to joinder of causes of action or as to
the parties to this appeal, or as to the jurisdiction over themn of the
court.
The petition for a rehearing is therefore overruled.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
A. J. HARNER v. LAWRENCE DIPPLE.
An undertaking by an infant as surety for the stay of execution is not void, but
only voidable, and when ratified by him after arriving at majority, becomes a valid
and enforceable contract.

MOTION for leave to file a petition in error to the District Court
of Clarke county.
The original action was brought by Dipple against Harner, on
an undertaking for stay of execution, executed by the defendant.
during his minority. It appears that the defendant arrived at his
majority before the period of stay expired, and that after the expiration of the stay he acknowledged his liability, and promised the
plaintiff, to whom the undertaking was made, to pay the amount of
the judgment stayed. Upon this state of facts judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas, which judgment was afterward affirmed by the District Court.
To reverse these judgments leave is now asked to file a petition
in error.

Spencer & Arthur, for the motion cited: 1 Parsons on Contracts 295; Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Blackst. 511; Reeves' Domestic
Relations 378 n.; 2 Kent's Com. 236; 1 Mason 32; Bingham
on Infancy 23; Swan's Treatise 601-2 ; Baker v. Lovitt, 6 ,lass.
78; Oliver v. Hondlet, 13 Id. 237; Whitney v. -Dutch, 14 Id.
457; Boston Bank v. Chamberlin, 15 Id. 220; Chandler v.
AfeKinney, 6 Mich. 217; Dunton v Brown, 31 Id. 182; 11
S. & R. 305; Tyler on Inf. and Cor. 42, 48; 54 Penna. St. 380;
Story on Contracts, sect. 57; 10 Ohio 127; 8 East 331.
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Keifer & White, contra, cited Swain's Treatise 601; Tucker
v JMoreland,10 Pet. 59; 1 Am. Lead. Ca. (5th ed.) 299, 300, 304,
306; (ole v. .Pennoyer,14 Il. 160; Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. &
R. 305, 310; .Hi ly v. 3fargaritz, 3 Barr 428; Patclin v.
Cromach, 13 Vt. 330; Tyler on Inf. 56-7 ; Bing. on Inf. 43, 44;
TJzughn v. Darr, 20 Ark. 600; S'hropsldre v. Burns, 46 Ala.
108; Williams v. Mloore, 11 I. & W. 256; 1 Pars. on Con. (6th
ed.) *328, 329 and note b; Thornton v. Illingworth, 9 Eng. 0.
L. 256; aibbs v. Morrill, 3 Taunt: 307; Mason v. Denison, 15
Vend. 71; Conroe v. Birdall, 1 Johns. Cases 127; Ayers v.
Hewitt, 19 Me. 281 ; Arnold v. Richnmond Iron Works, 1 Gray
434; 2 Kent 235, 247; Roof v. Stafford, 7 Cowen'185; Slocum
v. Harker,13 Barb. 537; 3 Burr. 1804; Fondav. Van Hforne, 15
Wend. 681; Petrow v. Wisenzan, 40 Ind. 148; MKline v. Beebe, 6
Conn. 494 ; Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The question made is, was the undertaking sued
on absolutely void, or only voidable. If void, it was not subject to
ratification : if voidable merely, it ma' be enforced after ratification.
Having considered this question upon principle, as well as upon
authority, we are constrained to hold that the undertaking was
voidable only, and that after ratification it became a valid and binding engagement.
In disposing of this case, we make no note of those principles
which control cases where an infant, by reason of immaturity and
natural incapacity, is, in fact, unable to assent to the terms of an
alleged contract. When this undertaking was executed it contained
every element of a valid contract, save only, that the party was
under twenty-one years of age.
Except for necessaries, the law grants to infants immunity from
liability on their contracts This immunity is intended for their
protection against imposition and imprudence, and is continued
after majority as a mere personal privilege. This'privilege of
immunity, after majority, is not given because of the actual or supposed incapacity of an infant to enter into contracts intelligently
If actual incapacity existed; the privilege of
and prudently.
infancy would not be needed for the purpose of defence. And it
is contrary to our knowledge of human nature, that all infants are
incapable of intelligently and prudently entering into engagements
MCILVAINE,
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and assuming burdens. It is a matter of favor intended as a shield
and compensation for the want of that greater wisdom and prudence which time and experience usually teach.
But, whatever may have been the natural capacity of the infant,
whenever he arrives at majority, a time fixed by an arbitrary rule
which, in the nature of things, can not affect the personal capabilities of its subject, the law presumes that he has acquired all the
wisdom and prudence necessary for the proper management of his
affairs; hence, the law imposes upon him full responsibility for all
his acts and contracts.
In this new relation, it becomes his moral duty, and for its discharge he is invested with legal capacity to affirm and perform, or
to disavow, at his election, all his previous contracts of imperfect
obligation. Contracts for necessaries are of perfect obligation, and,
therefore, he can not disaffirm them. Contracts founded'on illegal
considerations are of no obligation, and, therefore, may not be
affirmed.
The appointment of an agent or attorney to make contracts is,
perhaps, inconsistent and repugnant to the privilege of infancy,
for the reason, among others that might be named, that it is imparting a power which the Principal does not possess; that of performing valid acts, But, outside of these exceptions, which are based
on special grounds, we see no reason why the power should be
denied, to ratify any contract which, as an adult, he might originally make. The power of disaffirmance being co-extensive, it is all
that is needed for his protection.
If, in the case before us, the ratification had been made by payment, instead of a promise to pay, its binding effect would not be
doubted. Why, therefore, should not the promise to pay be binding
also ? There is no question about consideration. The consideration which supported the original promise is sufficient to support
the ratifying promise.. The only contention here is, that the original promise was void by reason of infancy, not for want of consideration. If, therefore, actual performance by payment would have
been binding, so should the promise to perform; and this; too,
without regard to the fact whether or not the infantile contract was
beneficial or prejudicial. The principles of jurisprudence are not
violated by the performance of a contract prejudicial to the party.
Indeed, a person, suijuris,is as strongly obligated by his contracts
prejudicial as by those beneficial to himself; and the same principle
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should a.ply where a person, si juris, ratifies and confirms his

contract of infancy.
The plaintiff in error, however, relies chiefly.on the authority
of decided cases, and claims the settled law to be that all contracts
of an infant prejudicial to him are absolutely void, and that a contract of suretyship is of that class.
In Swan's late treatise, among contracts of infants which have
been decided to be void, is mentioned that of suretyship; but the
author, in speaking of the state of the authorities, pithily and truthfully remarks: " What contracts of an infant are void, and what
are merely voidable, nobody knows."
.Keanev. Boycott, 2 I. Blackst. 511, decided in 1795, appears to
be a leading case. The contract of an infant was held in that case to
be voidable only; but in the opinion of Chief Justice ERE a rule
was stated wherein certain of such contracts are said to be void.
The rule was thus stated: "1When the court can pronounce the
contract to be for the benefit of the infant, as for necessaries, it is
good; when to his prejudice, it is void; and where the contract is
of an uncertain nature as to benefit or prejudice, it is voidable only
at the election of the infant." This rule, modified so as to declare
that a contract neces8arily prejudicial to the infant is void, has
been adopted in many later cases, both in England and in this
country. But the current of more recent decisions repudiates the
distinction between void and voidable contracts on account of their
beneficial or prejudicial nature, and holds them all to be voidable
merely; and the more recent'decisions of courts still adhering to
the distinction, hold some contracts voidable only, which were
before held to be void. Thus, in Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403,
a surety contract was held to be voidable only, for the reason that
such contract, as a matter of law, cannot be said to be necessarily
prejudicial to the surety. Also, an account stated is held to be
voidable only: Williams v. Moor, 11 M. & W. 255. Also, a conveyance by lease and release: Zouc1 v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1194.
The following cases are to the effect that an infant's contract of
suretyship is merely voidable, and may be ratified. They also
show, with more or less force and directness, that the distinction
between void and voidable contracts of infants, -on the ground of
benefit or prejudice, is not sound: Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R.
305 ; ffinely v. .Targaritz, 3 Barr 428 ; Gatcein v. Cromach, 13
Ver. 330; Vaughn v. Dart, 20 Ark. 600; Shropshire v. Burns,
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• 46 Ala. 108; Williams v. 3oor, 11 M. & W. 256; Fetrow v.
Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; -Fondav. V'anLorne, 15 Wend. 631;
Scott v. Buchanan, 2 Humph. 468; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill.
158; Cummings v. Powell, 8 Texas 80; 1 J. J. Marshall 236;
Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. 329.
In Massachusetts, where the doctrine was approved that the acts
of an infant are void, which not only apparently but necessarily
operate to his prejudice (Oliver v. Clop, 13 Mass. 237), it was
afterward said by Chief Justice PARKER, in Whitney v. Duteh, 14
Mass. 457 : f' Perhaps it may be assumed as a principle, that all
simple cnetracts by infants, which are not founded on an illegal
consideration, are strictly not void, but only voidable, and may be
made good by ratification. They remain a legal substratum for a
future assent, until avoided by the infant; and if, instead of ai'oiding, he confirm them when he has legal capacity to make a contract,
they are, in all respects, like contracts made by adults." And
in 1840 (Reed v. Baelzelder, 1 Mete. 559), Chief Justice SHAw
said: "The question, what acts of an infant are voidable and
what void, is not very definitely settled by the authorities, but in
general it may be said that the tendency of modern decisions is to
consider them as voidable, and thus leave the infant to affirm or
disaffirm them when he comes of age, as his own views of his
interest may lead him to elect."
So that, Mr. Parsons, in his work on Contracts, vol. 1, p. 294,
6th ed., says: "The better opinion, however, as may be gathered
from the later cases cited in our notes, seems to be that an infant's
contracts are, none of them, or nearly none, absolutely void ; that
is, so far void that he cannot ratify them after he arrives at the age
of legal majority."
In 1 American Leading Cases 300, 5th ed., it is said: "The
numerous decisions which have been had in this country justify the
settlement of the following definite rule as one that is subject to
no exceptions. The onlr contract binding on an infant is the implied contract for necessaries. The only act which he is under a
legal disability to perform is the appointment of an attorney. All
other acts and contracts, executed or executory, are voidable or
confirmable by him at his election," on arriving at majority. This
rule has been quoted and approved in 14 Ill. 158, and 15 Gratt.
829, and we think it embodies the better reason.
In the light of principle, therefore, as well as by the weight of
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the later authorities, the whole question should be thus resolved:
The privilege of infancy is accorded for the protection of the infant
from injury resulting from imposition by others or his own indiscretion. That object is fully accomplished by conferring on him
the power to avoid his contracts, or, in other words, by giving him
immunity from liability until such contracts are ratified by himself
after arriving at full age. And, again, that an adult, laboring
under no disability, may perform his unexecuted contracts of
infincy, whether they be beneficial or prejudicialto him, and that
he will be bound by such performance, we think is a proposition
too plain to be doubted. If, therefore, with full knowledge of the
facts, he ratifies and affirms them, being moved thereto by his own
sense of right and duty, he should in law, as in morals, be bound
Motion overruled.
to their performance.
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A settlement by a husband who is not in debt and not in contemplation of any
new or unusual business ventures, of a part 6f his estate, not exceeding one-sixth
of the whole, upon his wife, is valid and unimpeachable.
Such a settlement is not invalid because not made in due legal form by the intervention of a trustee. Where it is otherwise good, equity will not' allow it to
fail for mere want of an intervening trustee.
Nor ii such settlement made invalid by the insertion of a power of revocation
in the husband. Such a power has by the long-established practice in equity become a proper part of every deed of fimily settlement.
The exercise of the power of revocation in favor either of himself or of a stranger would terminate the separate estate of the wife and subject the property to the
claims of the settlor's creditors.
But an assignment in bankruptcy by the settlor is not an exercise of the power
.
of revocation, nor does it pass that power to his assignee.
P~owers of revocation and appointment over property within a voluntary settlement, even though such as may be exercised by a bankrupt for his'own benefit, do
not pass by an assignment oran adjudication in bankruptcy; nor will equity compel the bankrupt to execute them for the benefit of the assignee.

Ox the 3d of October 1872 the defendant, Charles I. Clifton,
being then free from debt, and with a fortune probably exceeding
$250,000, conveyed to his wife, without the intervention of a
trustee, a small parcel of land, worth about $700, and assigned to
her five policies of insurance on his life, each for $10,000, but at
the time not worth more in the aggregate than $12,000.
VOL. XXVI.-90
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On the 1st of April 1873, being still free from debt, and with
his fortune very little diminished, he made another conveyance to
his wife, also without the intervention of. a trustee, of twb parcels
of land, one situated in the city of Louisyille and the other in the
county of Jefferson. The first parcel was, at the time of this conveyance, and still is, encumbered by mortgage to probably its full
value. The other parcel was the homestead of the ancestors of
the grantor, and was estimated to be worth $18,000. On this
parcel he afterwards erected a dwelling-house which cost $8500.
By both deeds, and substantially in the same terms, the property
was conveyed "to the said Nannie, to hold to her and her heirs
for ever as her own separate estate, free from the control, use and
benefit of her husband." By both deeds, and substantially in the
same terms, power and authority were conferred on the grantee to
appoint the parcels of land and each or all of them, or part or
parts of each, as often as she might choose to exercise the same, to
such uses as she might designate by joint deed with her husband,
or by a writing in the form of and to take effect as a devise under
the Statute of Wills of Kentucky, and by both deeds, in substantially the same terms, the grantor expressly reserved to himself
power to revoke the grants in whole or in part, and to appoint to
any such uses or persons as he might designate either by deed or
last will. In default of appointment, or to the extent that the
grantor might fail to appoint, each of said parcels of land was to
remain to the grantee and her heirs for ever as her separate estate,
with the powers conferred upon her as above stated.
On the 4th of December 1875, Clifton filed his voluntary petition
in bankruptcy, and was adjudged bankrupt thereon, and the complainant, Stephen E. Jones, was appointed his assignee.
In October 1876 the assignee brought this suit in equity, in
which he sought to have both of the above-mentioned deeds declared
void, and thus the clqus removed from his alleged title to the
parcels of land and policies of insurance mentioned therein.
B. H. Bristow and Jas. A. Beattie, for complainant.
Bijur

Davie, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BALLARD, Circuit Judge.-The bill proceeds on three grounds,
all more or less connected, but still so distinct as to require a sepa-
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rate statement: 1. That the making of the two instruments was a
contrivance idelschem on the part of Charles -1. Clifton to cheat,
hinder and defraud his future creditors. 2. That the conveyances
haviig been made by the husband to the wife, without the intervention of a trustee, are, because of this, and because of the
reservations contained therein, especially the absolute power of
revocation, void, and so passed no title or interest to the nominal
grantee. 3. That by operation of the Bankruptcy Act, the property
described in the instruments, or, at least, the powers of revocation
therein reserved, passed to the complainant as assignee in bankruptcy.
The comI shall examine each of these grounds separately
plainant has offered no testimony whatever of the alleged fraudulent
intent. ie does not even allege that the grantor at the time the
conveyances were executed owed anything. The uncontroverted
proof is that he was then free from debt; that lie was not then
engaged in trade; that he did not contemplate engaging in trade
or contracting debts; that he was an indiscreet young man, who,
though possessed of a large fortune, might squander the whole in
reckless gaming and dissipation; that the settlements were made
at the suggestion of his more prudent wife, and did not embrace
more than one-sixth of his estate. That Clifton might, under these
circumstances, by proper eonveyjances, have settled on his wife this
amount of property, free from all claims proceeding from his future
creditors, or from his assignee in bankruptcy, is indisputable. The
authorities everywhere sustain such settlements :.-Sexton v. W7heaton
and Wife, 8 Wheat. 229; Hinds, Lessee, v. Longworth, 11 Id.
211-213 ; -Haskellv. Bakewell, 10 B. Mon. 206 ; Lloyd v. Fulton,
91 U. S. 485; Smith v. Trodges, 92 Id. 183. Authorities to the
same point might be multiplied indefinitely.
The learned counsel of complainant themselves do not dispute
that such settlements are generally unimpeachable. Their contention is that the settlements in controversy here were not made by
proper conveyances; that the conveyances being made by the husband to the wife without the intervention of a trustee are void in
law, and that by reason of the powers of revocation reserved, they
are void both in law and in equity.
It thus appears that the complainant does not now ask relief on
the ground of the distinct fraud alleged. If he attaches any importance to the allegation of fraud contained in his bill, it is only
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because he cnsiders that a deed made by a husband to his wife,
containing a reservation of an absolute power to revoke it, is per so
fraudulent. Thus considered, the complainant's first ground becomes
blended with the second, and one and the same with it. I proceed,
therefore, to consider the second ground.
Under the common-law system the husband and wife are, for
most purposes, regarded as one person. As a result of this legal
unity, their contracts with each other, whether executo y or executed,
in parol or under seal, are void. This doctrine, it must be confessed, has little foundation in reason. It is wholly unknown -in
that enlightened system of jurisprudence, which, coming down to
us from the ancient civilization, now prevails, on the continent of
Europe, and it has only a faint recognition in the system, of equity
jurisprudence, which in England and in this country has grown
up by the side of the common law. In equity the husband and
wife are for many purposes treated as two persons. Whilst at law
all the personal property of the wife becomes on marriage the property of the husband, and the entire management and profits of her
real estate pass to him, in equity she may not only own and manage
her real and personal estate, but she may dispose of it free from the
control of her husband. True, it was at one time doubted whether
any interest in either real or personal property could be settled to the
exclusive use of a married woman without the intervention of
trustees, but for more than a century and a quarter it has been
established in courts of equity that the intervention of trustees is
not indispensable, "and that wherever * * * property * * * is
settled upon a married woman, either before or after marriage, for
her separate and exclusive use, without .theintervention of trustees,
the intention of the parties shall be effectuated in equity, and the
wife's interest protected against the marital rights of her husband,
and of his creditors also :" 2 Story's Eq. Jurisp., sect. 1880.
Nor is it. at all material whether the settlement is made by a
stranger or by the husband himself. In either case the trust will
attach upon him, and will be enforced in equity. It is now universally held that a settlement made by a husband on his wife by
direct conveyance to her will be enforced in the same manner and
under the same circumstances that it will be when made by a
stranger, or when made to a trustee for her exclusive use: Bhepard
v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Oh. 56 ; Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gratt. 259;
Sims v. Rickets, 35 Ind. 192; Thompson, v. Mills, 39 Id. 582:

JONES v. CLIFTON.

Putnam v. Bicknell, 18 Wis. 335; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14
Mich. 91; Barron v. Barron, 24 Vt. 398; Marraman v. Marraman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 84; TVfallingsford v. Allen, 10 Pet. 594.
All voluntary conveyances, whether made wholly without consideration or upon the meritorious consideration of love and affection, are scrutinized and regarded with some suspicion in courts of
equity when they are sought to be impeached by creditors. But I
have been referred to no case, and I have found none, which hints
that a reasonable settlement made by a husband, free from debt, on
his wife, by direct conveyance to her, is any more impeachable than
when it is made through the intervention of trustees. Settlements
made in either mode, when uncontaminated by actual fraud, are
unimpeachable by subsequent creditors.
It may be admitted that a power of revocation inserted in an
assignment made by a debtor for the benefit of his creditor, would
render such assignment constructively fraudulent, and therefore
void: Biggs v. 111urray, 2 Johns. Ch. 576; s. c. 15 Johns. 571;
Tarback v. Varbery et al., 2 Vern. 570 ; but such power of revocation has never been held to affect a family settlement. On the
contrary, in the above case of Biggs v. Murray, Chancellor KENT
expressly declares that "' family settlements may often require such
powers of revocation to meet the ever-varying interests of family
connections." Moreover, it is the well-settled practice in England
to insert such powers in such settlements, unless, indeed, the sole
object of the settlement is to guard against the extravagance and
imprudence of the settlor. Indeed, ever since Lord HARDWICKE'S
time the failure of'the conveyancer to insert a power of revocation
in a deed of family settlement has been regarded as'a strong badge
of fraud: Hugenin v. Basely, 14 Yes. 273.
In some of the later eases such settlements have been annulled
at the suit of the settlor, apparently on the sole ground that they
did not contain a power of revocation.
In Coutts v. Aeworthi, ILaw Rep. 8 Eq. 558, it was held that
"the party taking a benefit under a voluntary settlement * * *
containing no power of revocation, has thrown upon him the burden
of proving that there was a distinct intention on the part bf the
donor to make the gift irrevocable."
In Wallaston v. Tribe, Law Rep. 9 Eq. 44, the same rule is
recognised and enforced.
In Euerett v. Everett, Law Rep. 10 Eq. 405, the Chancellor,
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in annulling a deed of settlement made by a young woman soon
after she arrived at age, chiefly on the ground that it contained no
power of revocation, says, in substance: "The sole object of the
settlement being to protect the settlor and her children, if she
married, had I been called on for advice I should have said: ' Have
proper trustees, give her a voice in the selection of new trustees,
and give her a power of revocation with the consent of the
trustees.' "
In Phtillips v..Mullings, Law Rep. 7 Ch. App. Cases 244, the
Court of Appeal recognises the same general rule, but in that case
refused to annul the settlement, though it contained no power of
revocation, on the distinct ground that the settlement was made by
a young man of improvident habits to guard against his own folly,
and "the deed was explained to him and the particular clauses
broughwto his notice."
"Those who induce," said the Lord Chancellor, "a young man
of this description to execute such a deed, are bound to show that
the deed is in all respects proper, or, if the deed contains anything
out of the way, that he understood and approved it. * * * It is
not necessary to show that the usual clauses inserted by conveyancers were explained, but any unusual clauses must be shown to
have been brought to his notice, explained and understood."
In .Hall v. Hall, Law Rep. 14 Eq. 365, the Vice-Chancellor
regarded the rule as so firmly settled, that he felt impelled to annul
a settlement twenty years after its execution, simply because it did
not contain a power of revocation. The same rule has been recognised and adopted in the United States: Russell's Appeal, 75
Penna. St. 269; Carnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243.
Some chancellors have intimated that a voluntary settlement partakes very much of the nature of a last will, and that it should
be scarcely less revocable.
I feel much difficulty in yielding assent to the extreme doctrine
announced in some of these cases, and I am glad to observe that it
is somewhat modified and_ limited by the late case of Hall v. Hall,
decided by the Court of Appeals in Chancery, in 1873: LawRep.
8 Ch. Ap. 430. I quite agree with what Sir W. l. JAMES, L. J.,
says in this case: "The law of this land permits any one to dispose of his property gratuitously, if he pleases, subject only to the
special provision as to subsequent purchasers and as to creditors.
The law of this land permits any one to select his own attorney to
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advise him: and it seems very difficult to understand how this
court could acquire jurisdiction to prescribe any rule that a voluntary conveyance executed by a person of sound mind, free from any
fraud or undue influence of any kind, and with sufficient knowledge
of its purport and effect, should be void because the attorney of his
own selection did not advise him to insert a power of revocation,
or did not t:ike his express direction as to the insertion or omission
of such power."
The true rule is that laid down by Lord Justice TuRNER, in
Tokerv. Toker, ) DeG., J. & S. 487,491, that the absence of a power
of revocation is a circumstance to be taken into account, and is of
more or less weight according to the circumstances of each case.
In the case now before me, I think it could not be seriously
contended that, had powers of revocation been omitted from the
conveyances made by Clifton, this fact would have been e titled to
much, if any, consideration, in a suit brought by him to annul the
settlements. To such a suit the chancellor might have said, as
Chancellor IIAtIIERLEY did in _Pillips v. Mullens, "You were an
exceedingly indiscreet and improvident young man. You made
the settlements to guard against yQur own folly and extravagance.
Of what advantage would it have been to place the money in this
way out of your control, and then give you power to destroy the
limitations whenever you pleased ?"
But, whatever may be the true doctrine, all of the foregoing
cases, and many more that might be cited, certainly do establish
that it is ordinarily proper to insert a power of revocation in a
voluntary settlement; nay, more, that the omission of such a power
will subject the settlement to more or less suspicion. Certainly
the practice in England for centuries has been to insert such a
power in family settlements.
A practice which is thus approved by time, and which has
received the sanction and encomium of courts of equity in both
England and America, cahnot be regarded as vicious or immoral.
Should I hold that these settlements of Clifton are fraudulent and
void as to his subsequent creditors, simply because they contain
powers of revocation, I should overturn an ancient practice and a
long course of decisions; nay, I should hold tliat courts of equity
have themselves advised frauds to be committed.
The fact that Clifton inserted powers of revocation in his settlements, so far from proving that he contemplated defrauding his

720.

JONES r*.CLIFTON.

future creditors, tends to show the contrary. Should he simply
revoke the settlements, then, of course, the property conveyed
woul revert to him, and be liable at law for all his debts. And
should he exercise the power of appointment for even the benefit
of a stranger, then., according to an unbroken current of authority,
the whole estate appointed would be liable in equity to his debts:
DTiompson v. Towne, 2 Vern. 319; _I re Davie's Trusts, Law Rep.
13 Eq. 163; Williams v. Lomas, 16 Beav. 1; .Petre v. .Petre,
14 Id. 197. If, then, he had meditated a fraud, he would have
omitted the power altogether. le would have relied altogether
on the affection and beneficence of his wife to provide for him.
To contend that he intended to defraud his creditors and at the
same time to exercise the power of revocation arbitrarily, is to
maintain a contradiction, since, as we have seen, the exercise of the
power would, ipso facto, render the property liable in equity for
his debts, unless, indeed, we can assume that he was gifted with a
foresight which none of the facts warrant. A man, it is true,
might make a voluntary settlement on his wife, and, contemplating
that he might be adjudged a bankrupt in the future and be discharged from his debts, reserve a power of revocation for the very
purpose of reinvesting himself, in such contingency, with the property, relying upon holding it free from debts contracted before
bankruptcy. It is by no means certain that such a reliance would
be safe. It is by no means certain that such a device would not
be pronounced a fraud on the Bankruptcy Act. But assuming
that it would not be fraudulent, there is nothing in the present case
to suggest that the grantor had any such forethought, or was actuated by any such motive. At the time of the settlements he was
not only free from debt, but possessed of a large estate. Ile was
not engaged in trade, and all the testimony shows that nothing was
farther from his contemplation than bankruptcy. That he did in fact
become bankrupt in the short space of two years, is partly explained
by the large shrinkage in the value of real property, and the decrease
in its rents, but it is best accounted for by his frank confession
that he has squandered much in reckless dissipation and gaming.
I do not mean to intimate that Clifton, having regard to the
motive and circumstances which prompted these settlements, should
not have reserved a power of revocation. Had he known his own
habits as well as his acquaintances knew them, and had his motive
been solely to guard against his follies, it would have been more
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consistent with that motive to deprive himself of all dominion over
the estate settled. But he could not know himself as others knew
him, and he doubtless had implicit faith that, even should misforttines overtake him, his affection for his wife would be a sufficient guaranty that he could not be persuaded to strip her of his
bounty.
The settlements being of his own pure bounty, he might well
wish to reserve to himself power to modify the limitations of them
according to the future necessities and exigencies of his family.
Then, too, the grantor has given reasonable explanation of the
particular reservation contained in these deeds. He says that, at
the time they were made, he contemplated removing to California,
and that his object in reserving the powers of revocation was that
he might change the investments from Kentucky to California. He
did not expect to exercise the powers for his own benefit; he did not
know that he could do so. He only contemplated settlements in
California to the same uses declared in the original conveyances.
This- suggestion derives additional force from the uncertainty in
which the law of Kentucky stood at the time the conveyaihces were
made in respect to the power of a marriea woman over her separate
estates.
The Revised Statutes adopted in 1852 had, in effect, destroyed
separate estates. They had, in effect, provided that where real or
personal property should be conveyed or devised to the separate
use of a married woman she should not alienate the same by joining
her husband in an ordinary conveyance or in the exercise of a power,
except when the estate was a gift, and then it might be conveyed
by the consent of the donor, or his personal representative.
This provision was so anomalous that it gave much perplexity to
the legal profession and produced much litigation. It was frequently amended, but, even down to the date of the settlements in
question, its precise meanipIg and operation were not determined.
So uncertain was its construction, that timid lawyers might have
been found who would not have advised the acceptance of a conveyance from husband and wife, of an estate conveyed by the husband to the separate use of the wife. At any rate, Clifton might
well have thought it best to guard against the uncertainty by
reserving to himself a power which would avoid all difficulty.
Every grantor in England has, by virtue of the second section
of the Statute of 27 Elizabeth, the substantial right to revoke and
VoL. XXVI.-9.
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annul his voluntary conveyance, since such conveyance is declared
by said statute to be fraudulent as to subsequent purchasers for
value, with or without noice: Dolphin v. Aylward, Law Rep. 4
Eng. and Irish Appeals 486; Roberts on Conveyances 39-41. A
grantor may therefore revoke or annul his voluntary conveyance
at any time by conveying the property included in such conveyance
to a purchaser for value. But the statute is limited in its remedial operation to purchasers, and consequently such settlements can
not be defeated by subsequent creditors: Dolphin v. Ay4lward,
supra. So, also, the fifth section of the same statute, which makes
all conveyances containing powers of revocation fraudulent and
void as to subsequent purchasers, does not extend to creditors.
Voluntary settlements, whether they do or do not contain powers
of revocation, cannot be assailed by creditors unless they are fraudulent. They are revocable by the grantor either by virtue of the
express power reserved or by virtue of subsequent conveyance for
value, but it has never been held that they are on this account fraudulent as to creditors.
But, say complainant's counsel, Mrs. Clifton's title is but the
"ghost of a title;" that the legal title is or was in her husband,
who reserved to himself absolute power to revoke or to appoint to
new uses, and that therefore it is not such a title as a court of equity
will uphold.
I know it is sometimes said that a court of equity will not enforce
every deed 'Made by a husband to his wife: Bishop on the Law of
Married Women, sect. 717. The cases usually cited to support
this view are Beard v. Beard, 3 Atk. 71; MoM]se v. aayles, 2 Vern.
385; Stoit v. Ayloff, 1 Ch. Rep. 33.
Of all these cases it may be said that they were decided at a time
when the rights of married women were not so fully acknowledged
or so zealously protected by courts of equity as they are at the present day. It is also to be observed that in the first case the gift
was so extravagant as to excite just suspicion of fraud and undue
influence. In the second the court refused to aid the defective
grant on the ground that it was without consideration. In the third
the contract was executory. None of these cases would at all
impeach a grant containing no more than a fair provision for the
wife, and if they would, they are oppoed to the cases heretofore
cited in this opinion, to the well-settled doctrine of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and to the whoie current of later
authority.
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When the settlement is made by a husband free from debt, when
it is induced by no fraudulent motive, when it makes no more than
a reasonable provision for the wife, when it confers any benefit on
her, I can conceive of no reason why a court of equity should decline to uphold it. Though the grant may not contain every provision which a chancellor would direct to be inserted in a settlement
ordered by himself, though it contains reservations tending to impair the full benefit of the provision made for the wife, yet if the
grant confer any substantial benefit on tile woman, so long as she
is in the actual enjoyment of that benefit, a court of equity should
and will protect her.
Again, complainant's counsel, whilst they admit that a husband
may, by direct conveyance to his wife, make a 'rovision for her
which will be enforced in equity, whilst they substantially admit
that the provision made by Clifton for his wife was reasonable,
whilst they admit that the grants made by him are not void, simply
because of the powers reserved in them, yet they somehow insist
that all these things combined vitiate the deeds. Their contention
is, that as the legal title remained in the husband, notwithstanding
the alleged conveyances, and that as this legal title is coupled with
absolute dominion over the property, as a legal consequence of the
reserved powers, the whole right and property remained in the
husband, and passed on his bankruptcy to his assignee. But if, as
we have seen, the husband may make a conveyance to his wife
which will be upheld in equity; if, as we have also seen, the reservation of a power of revocation or of a new appointment does not
render such settlement void, it is impossible to conceive that the
union of the two particulars in the same instrument would destroy
it. It is inconceivable that the mere union of two objections, each
of which is a phantom, can render the compound substantial.
It must not be overlooked that complainant himself has appealed
to a court of equity. In this court Mrs. Clifton's title is as complete as if she had been a feme sole when the conveyances were
made to her. The husband's right and interest are not recognised
in this court. Every argument, therefore, which is founded on the
notion that any substantial title or interest remains in him can have
no force in this forum.
The last proposition of complainant's counsel is, that by operation of the bankruptcy act, the property embraced in these settle
ments, or at least the powers therein reserved, which might be ex-
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ercised by the grantor for his own benefit, passed to his assignee
in bankruptcy.
We have seen that the title which the bankrupt at the time of
his bankruptcy held in the property claimed, was held in trust for
his wife. Now, by the express terms of the statute, property so
held does not pass to the assignee in bankruptcy. Sect. 5053 of
the Revised Statutes, provides that "no property held in trust by
the bankrupt shall pass by the assignment."
To ascertain what property does pass to the assignee in bankruptcy, reference must be had to sections 5044 and 5046. The
first of these sections provides that "as soon as the assignee shall
be appointed and qualified, the judge or * * * register shall
* * * assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and
personal, of the bankrupt, with all his deeds, books and papers
relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and by operation of
law shall vest the title to all such property and estate, both real
and personal in the assignee." The second provides that "all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, all rights
in equity, choses in action, patent rights aid copyrights, all debts
due him or any person for his use, and all liens and securities
therefor, and all his rights of action for property or estate, real or
personal, and for any cause of action which he had against any
person arising from contract or from the unlawful- taking or detention or injury to the property of the bankrupt; and all his rights
of redeeming such property or estate, together with the right, title,
power and authority to use, manage, dispose of, sue for and recover
or defend the same, as the bankrupt might have had if no assignment had been made, shall, in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of his assignee * * * be at once
vested in such assignee."
It will be perceived that powers of' revocation and powers of
appointment, though they be such as may be exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit, are not enumerated among the things,
which pass to the assignee either by virtue of the assignment or
of the adjudication in bankruptcy. The "power" which is enumerated and does pass, is only the power to sell, manage, dispose
of, sue for and recover, or defend the property and rights, which
do pass.
A power is not property or an estate. A power to convey or
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appoint property may be lodged in one having no interest whatever in the property over which the power is to be exercised or in
one having an estate or interest in it. But in either case the power
is distinct from tile estate. It may be that a grant of property to
A., to dispose of it as he should please, would invest him with a
complete title ; but a grant to A. for life, with remainder to such
persons as he should by deed or will appoint, will not give him the
absolute interest, although he might acquire it by the exercise of
the power: Sugden on Powers, vol. 1, p. 120; IMaundrill v.
Manrill, 10 Vesey 246; Reed v. ,SVergold, Id. 871 ; Burleigh v. Clough, 52 N. II. 272 - Collins v. C'arlisle's Heirs, 7 B.
Mon. 18; McGaughey's Adm'r v. Henry, #e.,,15 Id. 883. So
a conveyance by A. to B. and his heirs in trust for A. for life,
remainder to such persons or uses as A. should appoint, and in
default of appointment, in trust for C. and his heirs, would leave
or vest in A. a life estate only. Or, if A. should convey to
B. in trust for himself for life, reserving to himself an absolute
power of revocation, still A. would have only a life estate in the
property trusted. The power of revocation reserved would neither
render the conveyance.void nor have the effect of enlarging his
estate. The learned judges who decided the case of Willard v.
Ware, 10 Allen 263, certainly so understood the rule, else they
need not have troubled themselves with the perplexing question
presented in that case, whether the power of appointment reserved
in the deed, which was there the subject of consideration, had been
actuall r exercised.
The bankruptcy statute of 13 Eliz. "enables the commissioners
to dispose of any estate, for such use, right or title as such offender
(bankrupt) then shall have in the same which he may lawfully
depart withal." And the statute of 21 James 1.directs bankrupt
law to be expounded most favorably for the relief of creditors. I
quite agree with Sir EDWARD SIJGDEN when he says, that "as a
power is a mere right" to'declare the trust of an estate upon which
declaration the Statute of Uses immediately operates, and, as it is
therefore clearly a use, interest, or right which the bankrupt "may
lawfully depart withal," there is considerable ground to contend
that the bargain and sale of the commissioner sliould have the same
operation as the execution of the power by the bankrupt whilst solvent would have had, but such was never in fact the construction
of these statutes. In Town&4 end v. Tindham, 2 Yes. Sr. 3, and
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in Thorpe v. Goodall, 17 Yes. 388, Lord KING is said to have held
that in the case, of a tenant for life, with power to charge 1001.,
the power -was not such an interest as would pass to the assignees.
Holmes v. Coghill, 7 Yes. 498, was thus: Sir John Coghill,
under a settlement made by himself in 1757, reserved the power
to himself to charge the estate, situate in certain counties, -with any
sum not exceeding 20001. Sir John -was also entitled to other
estates, remainder in tail to his oldest son. The son arrived of age
in 1787, and thereafter he and the father suffered a recovery, and
then made a settlement. This settlement embraced all or some of
the property mentioned in the settlement of 1757. It expressly
extinguished the power reserved in the settlement of 1757, but it
directed the trustees to raise such sum, not exceeding 20001., as
Sir John should direct, and pay the same to him or his assigns;
or, if the same should not be raised and paid over in his lifetime,
then upon trust to raise the same at such time and pay the same
to such person as Sir John should appoint. By his will, dated in
1775, and therefore before this settlement, Sir John gave the sum
of 20001., to be raised under the power, to be applied to the payment of his debts. There was a codicil to this will, which bore
date subsequent to the settlement of 1788, but it took no notice
of this power.
The bill was filed by creditors. Held, by the MAaster of the Rolls,
Sir WILLIAm GRANT;

First. That the power reserved in the original deed qf 1757
was discharged by the deed of 1787.
Second. The will refers only to the power reserved in the deed
of 1757, and consequently it is no execution of the power reserved
in the deed of 1787.
Third. There is an evident difference between a power and an
absolute right of property.
Fourth. Equity will aid the defective execution of a power,
but it can miot itself execute a power.
The case was affirmed on appeal, 12 Vesey 206. On the appeal
it was urged that there is a difference between an estate to be -created under a power which must be limited to a third person and
one which may be limited to the donor himself. It was conceded
that in the first case the power must he asserted, but in the latter
it was strongly insisted, that, as the donor had the same power
over the estate which he has over his own estate, it should, in
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equity, at least, be equally subject to his debts. But the court
rejected the distinction, remarking: " if the argument in support
of this appeal prevails, there must be an end of the distinction
between the non-execution and the defective execution of a power."
In Thorpe v. Goodale, IT Yes. 888, s. c. Id. 460, one who had
been adjudged a bankrupt was seised for life of a certain estate,
with a general power of appointment, with remainder in default of
appointment to the heirs of his body. The suit was by his assignee
to compel him to execute the power. Held by -Lord ELDON that
equity can not compel the execution of the power.
The lea ned chancellor, it is true, says that the question whether
the power passed by operation of law to the assignee was not
before him, but ie refers to the opinion imputed tQ Lord KING in
such terms as to show that he approves it.
Sir EDWARD SUGDEN says in his work on Powers, vol. 1, p. 225,
that upon a bill filed by the assignees against the purchaser in
this same case, the vice-chancellor was of opinion that the power
did not pass to the assignee. He cites Thorp v. Prere (N. C., M.
T. 1819), but I have not been able to find the case reported.
These decisions, doubtless, led to the enactment of 6 Geo. IV.
16, 5, 77. This statute provides that "all powers vested in any
bankrupt, which may be legally executed for his own benefit (except the right of nomination to any vacant ecclesiastical benefice),
may be executed by the assignees for the benefit of creditors in
such manner as the bankrupt might have executed the same." A
provision substantially the same has, I believe, been incorporated
into every bankrupt act which has been passed in England since
the date of the above statute, but no similar provision is to be found
in our statute, and I must conclude that it was omitted ex industria.
It certainly cannot be inferred that the draftsman of our statute
was unfamiliar with this provision. It may be found in both of the
English bankrupt acts of 1861 and 1869. And we know that many
of the provisions in our original and amended acts were copied from
these statutes.
But whether it was omitted intentionally or not may not be material. Our statute certainly contains no such provision, and it is
impossible to construe it as passing to the assigiiee anything which
the English statutes enacted prior to 6 Geo. IV. were held not
to pass.
As the power reserved by the settlor in his settlements might be
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exercised for his own benefit, it is clear that if he was a bankrupt
in England, his assignee, in virtue of the recent statutes there,
might exercise the power for the benefit of his creditors ; but as we
have no such statute here, as a power is neither real nor personal
property, nor an estate of any kind, it is equally clear that this
power did not pass to his assignees.
I have no doubt that, in respect to the property which does pass,
under our statute, to the assignee, all the power and dominion
which the bankrupt had over it b.efore his bankruptcy likewise
passes. Nor have I any doubt that the bankrupt, in virtue of the
general provisions of the statute, as well as in virtue of the express
terms of section 5050, may be required to execute any instruments,
deeds and writings which may be proper to enable the assignee to
possess himself fully of the assets; but it is only in respect to the
assets of the bankrupt which have passed to the assignee that he
can be required to execute any instruments, deeds or writings.
He cannot be required to execute a mere power, since a power is
not assets or property, or embraced among the things and rights
which the statute declares shall pass to the assignee.
But complainant's counsel insist that the justices of the Supreme
Court have given construction to our statute to the effect that it
does embrace powers to dispose of or charge property. In proof
of this, they refer to schedule B, which forms part of every bankrupt's petition, and which schedule was prescribed by the justices
under authority of law (section 4490).
It is true that the caption of schedule B implies that the petitioner shall include therein "property in reversion, remainder or
expectancy, including property held in trust for the petitioner, or
subject to any power or right to dispose of or charge." It is also
true that the directions in the body of that schedule seem to contemplate that the petitioner shall inention all "rights and powers
wherein I (he), or any. other person or persons in trust for me
(him) or for my (his) benefit have any power to dispose of, charge
or exercise."
No one more readily than I would submit to a decision of the
Supreme Court, but I cannot regard this schedule, though nominally prescribed by its justices, as a decision of the court. The
judges cannot in this way give an authoritative construction to the
statutes.
Beside, the schedule does not purport to be a construction of the
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statute, nor does it necessarily imply that all the rights enumerated
ill it will pass to the assignee in bankruptcy. It is true it would
seem idle to insert in the schedule anything in which the assignee
could have no interest ; but the petitioner cannot be allowcd to
judge whether or not a given right or interest will pass to his
assignee, and to include or exclude it from his schedule at pleasure.
His assignee should be fully infbrined respecting his estate. He
is entitled to have, and should have, all the information which the
bankrupt himself has.
This may suggest some explanation of the requisitions contemplated by the firm prescribed in the schedule. Certainly the form,
in terms, contemplates that the schedule shall include a mere naked
power to dispose of or charge property in which the bankrupt never
had any interest, and which lie could not dispose of or charge for
his own benefit. Surely no one would be so bold as to contend
that such a power passes in bankruptcy; yet, in my opinion, in
view of the decisions in England before referred to, construing
bankruptcy acts containing more comprehensive terms than ours;
in view of the legislation there declaring that po*ers which a
bankrupt may exercise for his own benefit shall pass to his assignee
in bankruptcy; in view of the terms of our statute and of its
omissions, there is scarcely more ground for the contention that a
power which may be exercised by the donee for his own benefit
passes to the assignee, either in virtue of the assignment to him
or of the adjudication in bankruptcy, than a power which must be
exercised by the donee for the benefit of a stranger.
Let an order be entered dismissing the bill with costs.

Appellate Court. Second District of Illinois.
CROFT PILGRIM v. THOMAS MELLOR.
Where an action, local in its nature, is founded on two things done in several
counties, and both are material and traversable, and neither will alone support the
action, it may be brought in either county.
Where a dam built in one county causes an overflow of land in another, the
owner of the land may bring his action in either county at his election.

SUIT was commenced by Croft Pilgrim against Thomas Mellor
before a justice in Stark county, where both parties resided, to re.
cover for an injury done by the defendant in erecting a dam upon
VOL. XXVI.-92
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his own premises, situated in the county of Stark, that 'so obstructed
the natural flow of the water as to produce al injury to the adjoining land of the plaintiff,, lying -in Bureau county. The ciuse was
removed to the Circuit Court, of Stark county, and there dismissed
for want of jurisdiction in the justice to -try it.
:.
... i
An appeal 'as taken from that ruling to this court, ana is here
assigned for error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIBTl.Y, J.-The only question to be determined in this case is
whethei. the justice of the peace in Stark county had any authority
to try the cause. That the action is local, in its nature, and -s a
general' rule in such cases, suit must be brought in the county
where the land is situated,
propositions whiih admit of very
little dispute. But it is insisted by appellant - that cases like the
present dne- form an exception 'to this general rule, that is, where
an act done in one county which produces an' injurious effect in
another,"the remedy may be enforced in' either. We, have been
referred to a number of authorities in support of that position.
Not many of them though'are directly in point. The"books indeed
are quite barren of decided cases on thepredise question.
It is true that most of the elementary writers concur in stating
the law as settled in favor of fhe position assumed by appellant: 1
Chit. 'P1. 269; 3,Black. Coin. 294; and note 4, Comyn's Dig. Act.
N. 167; Com. Dig., 250, '251; Gould's P1 108. T,his-doetrine
originated chiefly from the decision in Bulier's Case, 7 Coke 63,
although reference is 'there made to the ruling in the 'year books in
TIe Abbott of Stratford's Case, where a similar question arose. The
principle, however, in the former case is stated in broad and general terms, that, "in all cases where the action is founded upon two
things done in several counties, 'and both are material or traversable, and the one, without the'other, doth ,not maintain the action,
then the plaintiff may choose to bring his action in which of the
counties le will." This view of the law was sanctioned in the
M a yor of London v. Cole) 7 Term R. 583, where LAWRENCE,
J., says that "the rule in Bzlwer's Case gives a decisive ,answer
to the application ; itShows that where several Material facts arise
in different colinties, the plaintiff ma bring his action in either.
In Oliphant v. Smith, 3 P. & W. 180, it is said "that every action
foudcd'upon-a local 'cause 'shall be brought in the county where
'are,
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the causc of action arises. * * * The only exception to this
rule is the erection of a nuisance in one county to the injury of
lands in anothcr. 'fhere the action may be brought in either," and
reference is made to lac. Abr. 56, 57 and 58 ; Com. Dig. 250, 251.
So in Bardon v. Cvekrer, 10 Pick. 383, the rule in Bulwer's Oas;,
is endorsed in the following emphatic language by the court. "The
plaintiff may unquestionably maintain his action in either county,
in Bristol where the obstruction was raised, as well as in Plymouth.
where the injury was sustained. The law to be collected from
Buliwer's Case, is decisive upon this point, when one matter in one
county is depending upon the matter in another county, the plaintiff may choose in which county he will bring his action :" Angel
on Watercourses 420, states the law to be "where an injury has
been caused by an act (lone in one county to land, &c., situate in
another, the venue may be laid in either. The law to be collected
from Bidwer's Case is decisive upon this point, when one matter
in one county is depending upon the matter in another county, the
plaintiff may choose in which county he shall bring his action."
A single case has been referred to, and doubtless the only one that
can be found, by appellee where the point has been expressly decided
against the ruling in Bubwer's Case. In Warren v. Webb, 1
Taunt. 379, referred to, a nuisance had been created in the county
of Surrey by the defendant permitting the water from his eavestrough to escape through the plaintiff's wall in that county, and
suit was brought in Middlesex, where Lord MANSFIELD held it
could not be maintained. Also in Hlfersey and Irwell Nav. Co. v.
Douglas, 2 East 502, nothing was there decided except that the particular place in the county need n6t be correctly averred in the
declaration, no reference was made to this exception to the rule in
local actions. Nor is the case of Thompson v. C ocker, 9 Pick. 59,
to the point, for in that case the action was commenced in the
county of Plymouth where the injury was sustained, and it was
held that the suit was properly brought. What was said about
that being the only place to bring the action was mere dictum,
and afterwards overruled in Barden .v. Crocker. The case of
Eachus v. Trustees of Illinois and Mfficigan Canal, 17 Ill. 534,
and many other cases of that character were decided upon quite a
different principle. There the land injured was situated in a foreign jurisdiction, and for that reason alone the courts refused to
entertain the action. Angell in his treaty on Watercourses, sect.
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421, remarks that, "it is hardly necessary to point out the difference there is, as regards actions and suits between the relation
of counties in the same state and the relation between two distinct
and independent states."
The case alluded to where the exception to the rule in local
actions of a character like the one before us was repudiated, is that
of Woster v. Winnil)iseogee Lake Go., 5 Foster 525. There it was
.held that the action could be maintained only in the county where
the land was situated that sustained the injury. The authorities
are reviewed in a very able opinion delivered by Chief Justice GILCHRIST and the conclusion arrived at that the rule established in
.Bulwer's Case, and subsequently recognised and adopted by the
courts and elementary writers was " founded upon reasons which
had long ceased to exist," and therefore should be abrogated. We
are unable to assent to the conclusion or the reasons assigned for it.
Even if the reasons that led to the adoption of this rule have
ceased to exist, it does not necessarily follow that the rule itself
should be annulled. As for instance, the reasons for selecting a
jury to try the cause from the vicinage where the controversy arose.
have long since ceased to exist, but the practice of taking them from
the body of the county where the crime was committed or the suit is
being tried, has continued as a wise one from the time of the Year
Books until the present day without any very great desire to change
it. Besides, in what respect has the reason ceased to exist which
led to the establishment of this rule since it was adopted? By a
legal fiction the court, in ancient times, permitted a party to bring
suit in what was termed transitory actions in any county within the
realm where the defendant could be found, by stating in the declaration where the cause of action arose and adding under a videlict
the county where the suit was brought. This was done for the
purpose of facilitating the administration of justice. And was the
reason any less forcible or has it ceased to exist, for. allowing a
party to elect in cases like the present one to sue the defendant in
either county where he might be found, or as in the case we are
considering be deprived of any remedy at all except in some superior court that has the power to send its process out of the county ?
If a man is required to answer for his own wrongful act, is there
any good reason why he should not. be made to respond in the
county where he committed the deed which produced the result, as
w.eU as where the injury was sustained? It is. no answer to say

